

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY China

DATE DISTR. 12 Jan 54

SUBJECT Evaluation of Leadership of Chinese Communist Party/
Position of Chinese Communists in World Communist
Movement.

NO. OF PAGES 3

PLACE
ACQUIREDNO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW) 25X1DATE
ACQUIREDSUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793
AND 794, OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVE-
LATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

25X1

1. First of all, it is most essential that any study of the present Chinese Communist regime be correlated with and made part of a continuing study of Asian communism especially in southeast Asia, Japan, Korea, Philippines. Second, any such study is meaningless unless correlated with exhaustive continuing study of the Soviet Union. Every act of communism in Asia has its inception in and takes meaning and direction from the Kremlin. The underlying fact of the motivating idea of world revolution; that the world revolution is directed solely by Moscow; that every aspect of Asian communism, whatever national color it may take on the surface, is really an aspect of the planned world revolution-these must never be lost sight of.
2. The top brains of the Chinese Communist Party are Mao, Chou-En-lai, Liu Shao-Chi. To try to discern whether they are more pro-Soviet than pro-China, or vice versa, (or to make that question the basis for examining any other CCP top leader) is to waste time. Mao, Chou, and Liu, and every other top CCP leader, are first and exclusively dedicated to world revolution-in which the USSR is the acknowledged leader, and in which China is only a part. They believe, not that a strong communist China will make world revolution possible, but that only world revolution will make possible a strong China. They are puppets of world communism, i.e. of Moscow; they are entirely satisfied to be puppets. This level of CCP leadership will never break away from Moscow. Their entry into the Korean war proves this. They may disagree with Moscow; they may have to press for concessions, as they pressed to be permitted to end the Korean fighting. They may see errors in Moscow policy, for instance, internally, in farm collectivization, by which they will profit. But they will never question the basic fact of Moscow leadership and direction. For them, Leninism is supreme doctrine. You can forget any national Chinese brand or variation of communism as having any importance.
3. Mao, 100 per cent puppet, has mastered Communist Party techniques learned from Soviet teaching and experience. He should not be considered dreamer, idealist, native leader-but a skillful, efficient leader of world revolution. His CCP organization is perfected; the top leaders are wholly with him; he has complete control. He permits wide latitude of discussion-but rules. 25X1
25X1 he was freeing
China from sub-colonial status only to give China status as a full colony of Russia-that was the goal of Chinese communism. "Oh", said Mao, "communism in China is a long way off". This was in the thirties. There is no danger of Mao's losing control. He will never change his present relationship with the USSR.

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

DISTRIBUTION

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

SECRET

25X1

2.

4. Chou En-lai, [redacted] is polished, suave, 25X1
an excellent negotiator, apparently moderate and reasonable, a wonderful actor. But he is a lot more. He is the ablest of all the leaders under Mao. Like Mao, he is an unchangeable world revolutionary.
5. If Mao were to die, even very soon, there would be no struggle for power at the top. Although it is conceivable that a committee might take over, it is much more likely that Chou En-lai, as the most capable director, organizer, administrator, would succeed Mao. Moreover, the other top leaders would accept his leadership.
6. Liu Shao-Chi is close to Chou as second only to Mao. Liu would be part of any committee that might take over; he would be a key man as he is today. It is most likely that Chou En-lai would be single successor with Liu as the next in line and in power. Liu would never challenge Chou's superior position; he would support Chou.
7. The fact that the present top leadership has not long had the task of running the country, as contrasted with the task of fighting for power, does not imply the possibility of disagreement, struggles for power, purges, etc. Don't look to the history of the Russian bolsheviks, the struggle for succession to Lenin, the Trotsky story, Stalin's purges, as a precedent. There is no good analogy there. The Russians, when they came to power, had not lived and fought together, had never had to govern, had been in exile and separated. Mao and his men had already (before 1949) had 30 years of discipline by the party, had fought together, had organized and ruled a part of China, had tested their methods and ideology and loyalties, had purged the unreliable. When they came to power, they were already in the position of experience that the Russians didn't reach for 20 years after they seized power. No, don't consider the test of ruling all China as a new test. It has long since been met-in miniature, for example, in Yenan.
8. And don't draw quick comparisons between China, as, essentially, a satellite and other satellites. If you say that communist takeover and control of satellites has been effective only because the satellites were first conquered and occupied by the USSR, and that the real reason for the still surviving communist regimes is the presence of Soviet military force, that does not imply that the Chinese communist regime will fall because it has only a native party and army to support it. The CCP, with the long experience of the Soviets as an example, with a clearly defined goal from the start, is seasoned, perfectly organized; it needs and accepts Soviet advice, but no physical support. The Chinese communist army, which is completely controlled the party, has the power and ability to maintain the regime without any outside physical assistance. It is true that being revolutionaries fighting for power, and being rulers in power, are two different things. But revolutionaries in history who could not organize and administer, who did not have the required experience or ability to establish a stable regime, who failed, in short, to consolidate their gains-all of them lacked the perfected thing which is the communist party, the most amazing and effective control organization man has ever developed, the really significant phenomenon and most threatening aspect of communism. The Chinese communist regime, unless attacked from the outside, will consolidate its control of China and rule for many years.
9. As to the military, the rank and file are completely controlled by the party organization. They will obey. But as to their real loyalty to the communists-take the percentages of prisoners captured in Korea who voluntarily returned and who would not return, and you have one index of real feelings. The food and living assured the soldiers are the main reason for their "loyalty" to the regime; fear inspired by the party control system is another. The top military leaders are completely bound to Mao and the CCP; are world revolutionaries. There is no military clique with outside loyalties; and no chance of military leaders achieving real political power; they are subordinate in the regime and will remain so. There is no military leader today powerful in his own right. Personal armies have been broken up. No military leader would succeed to the top position in case of Mao's death. Regional personal strength, if you refer to the possibility of any CCP leader still controlling effective regional support for himself as an individual, is non-existent today. Cliques and groups-the Soviet trained students the groups who were in France with Chou-En-lai, the Hunan clique, and so on-as potential sources of splits in the CCP are figments of wishful thinking.
10. But all this does not mean that there are no dissident elements. The intellectuals are completely disillusioned, suppressed and helpless. And many others. The Chinese people as a whole hate the regime. But they will accept it passively and with Chinese patience for a long time. The Chinese suffer and obey, and have learned by bitter experience not to make overt signs of disaffection, or even to rush to welcome a liberator for fear the liberator is only temporary. Any spontaneous generation of either demonstration

SECRET

SECRET

3.

of disaffection or of effective revolt is not to be looked for within any time one can calculate now.

11. Of course the CCP has not intention of instituting any promised national reforms except as they will serve CCP purposes-and that means, also, only so long as they do not interfere with the great plan of world revolution. The questions: Will they now make good on their promises? Can they make good? Are beside the point. The CCP will do exactly what the world revolutionary leadership, Moscow, tells them; You ask if the regime will not at least make every effort to make China industrially and economically sound; to create a native military industry, if nothing more. They can't do it. Soviet Russia will never permit it. China will be economically dependent on the USSR. She will be militarily dependent. She will never, under the CCP, make a heavy industry that will assure her independence. Yes, the Chinese communists will realize this-if they don't already. But they will accept that situation. Already, one of the encouraging signs to the watcher on the outside is the stupidity of the CCP economic policies-a promise of weakness in the sense of continuing popular disaffection, even though significant only over a long time if there is not attack from the outside. You can be positive that no amount of dependence on and subordination to the USSR-economic or industrial-will cause the CCP even to consider different attitudes toward or relationships with the west, specifically the United States.
12. Sino-Soviet relations have already been touched upon. It can be added that it is true the Chinese people do not like the Russians. Probably the one thing that could cause a split would be a Soviet armed force on Chinese territory. But the Chinese Communists, in the matter of hating Russians, are not Chinese. They are Communists and Communists have no nationality. Furthermore, the Russians have studied the Chinese for years, as the west has never done, and they know exactly how far they can go, how to handle the Chinese. There will be no split in the foreseeable future. Remember that, so far as being ruled, in effect, by a foreign power is concerned, the Chinese have historically accepted foreign rule in fact for hundreds of years.
13. Now, despite all the foregoing, communism will fail in China. If it were attacked now, it would disintegrate precipitately. If it is not attacked, and that means from the outside, then, for all its cracks and flaws, it will last for a long long time. But you are right in marking this stage of China's history as a phase of national revolution going back into the last century, the stirring of a sleeping giant-and nothing will stop that giant from eventually gaining his feet and standing, dependent and strong and free.
14. To a Chinese it seems that the United States, the unquestioned world leader, the real repository of human hopes, is still uncertain, still without a firm, constructive, consistent policy of action to defeat world communism-and without a consistent effective policy toward China. But the magnitude of the task is realized too, and the moral weakness and wishful thinking of the allies of the United States; and so now is a period of inaction and uncertainty. It is to be hoped that, even if at this time no great policy decision can be reached by the United States, she will take immediate steps to make it possible for Chinese outside the mainland to get an education, to have free Chinese cultural centers, so that the CCP cannot, as it does now, attract young Chinese into Red China-young potential leaders who go only because they get education and careers nowhere else.

-end-

SECRET

25X1